





closing as much as possible without damaging
the integrity of policy deliberations. That integrity
is essential both to be sure that all issues are
fully debated and to ensure that information
obtained under pledge of confidentiality remains
confidential.
But there is another aspect to transparency
that is incompletely understood. Let me illustrate
by reading several passages from the FOMC
transcript. The transcript of FOMC meetings is
released to the public with a five-year lag and is
available on the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors’ web site. All the quotes are my own—
it would not be fair to pick on others!
“My overall assessment is that Asia is primarily
a relative demand shock rather than an aggre-
gate demand shock for the United States.”
(Transcript of FOMC meeting of March 31,
1998, p. 54.)
“Money growth, whether we use M2 or a nar-
rower measure—I prefer MZM because I think
it avoids the problem with sweeps…”
(Transcript of FOMC meeting of August 18,
1998, p. 50.)
“I have a question about the outlook for invest-
ment, which is driven importantly, as it should
be, by acceleration considerations.”
(Transcript of FOMC meeting of May 18,
1999, p. 18.)
What do you make of passages such as the
ones I just read? These passages are all taken out
of context, but my guess is that the material sur-
rounding these passages would not help much
in understanding them, unless the reader knows
a lot of economics. Much of the FOMC delibera-
F
ederal Reserve communications are
much in the news recently, in part
because the Fed’s main policy body,
the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) has discussed communications issues
on several occasions in recent years. I’ve spoken
several times on various aspects of communica-
tions policy and today want to extend my views,
which are developing further every time I take
up the subject.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—especially
Bob Rasche, director of Research at the St. Louis
Fed—for their comments, but I retain full respon-
sibility for errors.
TRANSPARENCY:
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Fed communications issues are often dis-
cussed under the general term “transparency.”
What, literally, does transparency mean? The idea
is that we could throw open the curtains and allow
the public to look in through clear windows. If
the Fed were to throw open the curtains, what
would the public observe?
Of course, what the public would observe
would be different from what now takes place.
Televising FOMC meetings on C-SPAN would
dramatically change the nature of the meetings.
Certainly, what we mean by transparency cannot
mean that all Federal Reserve deliberations are
public in real time. Transparency must mean dis-tion consists of fairly technical discussions.
Without an advanced degree in economics, or
extensive policy experience, much of this mate-
rial is simply incomprehensible. Thus, although
policy experts can understand undigested mate-
rial, the message that they would convey to the
general public would likely not be timely and
might not closely match, in emphasis and tone,
the consensus message the FOMC would want to
convey.
Moreover, a certain amount of communica-
tion during an FOMC meeting is nonverbal. For
people who have come to know each other pretty
well over the course of many meetings, some ref-
erences in a particular meeting have meaning only
in the context of discussions in prior meetings or
outside the formal FOMC meeting—during aca-
demic conferences for example.
The thrust of my argument is that the word
“transparency” is misleading with respect to
Federal Reserve communications challenges.
Instead, the Fed needs a conscious communica-
tions strategy rather than a strategy of simply
“opening up.” The purpose of a conscious strategy
is not to hide anything but rather to have a clear
transmission of information. Successful commu-
nication requires that the FOMC distill principal
messages or themes from its deliberations and
the vast amount of material considered.
As an aside, I note that the FOMC transcripts
are little discussed in the press. The general
assumption is that they are too old to be news-
worthy, but I think they also require a substan-
tial background in economics and the history of
monetary policy to interpret correctly. Thus, even
if the transcript were released promptly after a
meeting—which wouldn’t be constructive
because doing so would change the nature of the
Committee’s deliberations—I doubt that the tran-
script would be a very satisfactory communica-
tions vehicle.
FED COMMUNICATIONS GOALS
Any strategy requires a clear conception of
the goals. For Fed communications strategies
there are a number of possible goals; I will empha-
size two.
The Federal Reserve, as an agency created by
Congress, clearly has a responsibility to be politi-
cally accountable. The Fed needs to be responsive
to questions and concerns from the Congress and,
indeed, from the public at large. The Fed needs
to be as clear as possible as to the goals of mone-
tary policy and the standards to be applied to
judge the degree of success in meeting the goals.
The Employment Act of 1946 sets the goals in
general terms as maximum employment and pur-
chasing power. The Federal Reserve, in congres-
sional testimony, Fed documents and speeches,
provides its interpretation of these goals.
A second, somewhat different, goal of com-
munications strategy is to make monetary policy
more effective. This is a goal of great importance
for achieving the congressional mandate provided
to the Federal Reserve. To explain the importance
of clear communications to effective policy I need
to develop the argument starting with a theoreti-
cal framework.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Federal Reserve relies heavily on eco-
nomic theory developed over the span of many
decades. The theoretical framework is compli-
cated in its technical form and implementation
but quite straight forward in its bare-bones
abstract framework. The key element is the inter-
action between the Fed’s policy stance and the
response of the economy to changes in the policy
stance.
At each of its meetings, the FOMC sets the
intended, or target, federal funds rate. The federal
funds rate is the interest rate on interbank borrow-
ing and lending. Most fed funds transactions are
for one day—overnight loans in market parlance.
If the federal funds rate in the market is tending
above the target rate, the Open Market Desk at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York supplies
additional funds to the market through purchases
of Treasury securities, or transactions with similar
effect. If the rate in the market is trading below
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the market by selling Treasury securities or equiva-
lent transactions. These open market operations
adjust the supply of bank reserves so that the
market rate remains close to the intended rate.
The FOMC sets the intended rate so as to
achieve as closely as possible the goals of low
and stable inflation and maximum sustainable
economic growth. To understand how the FOMC
decides on the appropriate target funds rate, we
need to fill in details about how policy actions
affect the economy.
The only interest rate affected directly by
Fed open market operations is the federal funds
rate. The market determines longer-term interest
rates, such as Treasury bond rates of all maturities,
and mortgage rates. These rates depend critically
on expectations about the future. In particular, the
market’s expectation of a one-week rate depends
on the expected overnight federal funds rate over
the next seven days. In general, the rate on any
bond depends on expected short rates over the
horizon of the bond. Thus, the ten-year Treasury
bond rate depends on expectations of short-term
interest rates over the ten-year horizon.
Market expectations about future interest rates
depend on the interaction of two interrelated
sources of influence. One, obviously, concerns
Federal Reserve decisions on the intended federal
funds rate. Also important are expectations as to
the demands for and supplies of funds in the pri-
vate market. For example, with a simultaneous
investment and housing boom, credit demands
will be high and interest rates will tend to be bid
up. In pursuing its policy goals the FOMC will
be adjusting the federal funds rate as needed to
keep the inflation rate low and stable. Thus, the
market forms expectations about the underlying
state of the economy that will bear on Fed
decisions.
The Federal Reserve is constantly evaluating
the situation in the markets and trying to adjust
the intended federal funds rate to produce a sat-
isfactory equilibrium in the economy. When we
put the Federal Reserve’s and the market’s deci-




The interaction between the Federal Reserve
and the markets may be confusing at first sight,
and indeed was confusing to economists for gen-
erations until conceptual breakthroughs in the
1960s and 1970s clarified the issue. Market
behavior depends on expectations as to what the
Federal Reserve is going to do, and what the
Federal Reserve is going to do depends on what
the market and the economy are anticipated to do.
The full rational expectations macroeconomic
equilibrium occurs when the market behaves as
the Federal Reserve expects and the Federal
Reserve behaves as the market expects. In both
cases we assume that the expectations are fully
rational, by which we mean that the expectations
are fully informed on the basis of all available
information.
The paradigm of a full rational expectations
macroeconomic equilibrium sets the framework
for communications strategy. From the Federal
Reserve’s point of view, policy effectiveness will
be enhanced when the market has a complete and
accurate understanding of the Federal Reserve’s
goals and policy processes. Thus, to obtain good
policy outcomes it is in the Fed’s interest to pro-
vide as complete information as possible to the
market.
The abstraction of a full rational expectations
macroeconomic equilibrium provides a power-
ful starting point for analysis of communications
issues. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in reality
information is incomplete, in part because the
future is unknowable with precision. Moreover
at any given time some individuals inevitably
have more information and more processing
power than others.
Asymmetric Information
A feature of many market environments is
that some agents in the market have more infor-
mation than others do. In the monetary policy
context, the Federal Reserve has the largest and
most extensive economic information gathering
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staff but also has access to considerable confi-
dential information from individual firms. To
some extent this confidential information can be
disclosed in summary form without identifying
individual firms, but nevertheless the Fed’s timely
access to this information and knowledge of the
firms involved does give the Fed an advantage
over the market in general. However, the informa-
tion asymmetry is not totally one-sided. Individual
firms have enormous specialized market infor-
mation that the Fed does not have. For example,
large retail firms have day-by-day and even
hour-by-hour information on the scale of retail
transactions in the economy; large banks and
credit card companies have information on day-
by-day economic activity as they observe flows
of transactions on their own books. The relevant
economy-wide reports constructed by government
statistical agencies come out with a lag measured
in weeks to a month or more. These formal sta-
tistical reports are the primary source of Federal
Reserve information, and they are available to
everyone in the market. Although there certainly
is an issue of asymmetric information, my own
view is that asymmetric information is not a major
issue for Fed communications policy.
Policy Decisions Versus Policy
An extremely important distinction in the
policy literature is that between policy decisions
and policies. A policy is the systematic behavior
of the policy agency in determining individual
policy actions. Thus, how satisfactory a policy is
cannot be judged from any single policy action.
It is the sequence of policy actions and their rela-
tion to the observable economic environment
that define a policy. In principle, there should be
a policy response rule, or regularity, or formula,
or recipe, or whatever you want call it, that guides
or determines the individual policy actions. In
the absence of such a regularity, policy actions
would be random and capricious. Good policy
aims to be systematic—certainly not random and
capricious.
The difficulty is that in the monetary policy
arena no one has yet been able to derive a thorough
and complete statement of what the policy rule
is or should be.1 The reason for this situation is
that policymakers must respond to a flow of
information that differs in certain respects from
prior experience. In principle, in a rational
expectations equilibrium, the flow of new infor-
mation triggers policy actions that are highly
predictable in the market place. That is, as new
and unpredicted information arises, the Fed’s
and the market’s response to the information
should be highly predictable.
This conception of monetary policy creates a
communications challenge because many market
participants seem not to understand the frame-
work very well. What market participants want
to know more than anything else is what the Fed’s
next policy action is going to be. But, under most
circumstances the FOMC cannot predict its next
policy action because the Committee cannot pre-
dict the new information that will drive the policy
action. Thus, an important communications
challenge is for the Fed to explain the essential
difference between policy and policy actions and
why this distinction is critical to the effective-
ness of monetary policy.
Fed Disturbances
Rational expectations models are designed
so that the Fed policy action is a predictable
function of information as it arrives. These models
do not have a constructive place for a random
component to Fed policy. That is, in an abstract
model in which the Fed policy rule is specified
with precision up to a random term, the smaller
is the variance of the random term the more
effective the policy will be. Intuitively, it makes
sense that in the monetary policy context added
uncertainty from unpredictable policy should
1 I discussed this issue at some length in a speech in October 2005: “The Fed’s Monetary Policy Rule,” published in The Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, January/February 2006, 88, pp. 1-12.
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omy as a whole.
As an aside, note that there are policy envi-
ronments in which a random component to a
policy is an essential feature for policy success.
Transportation of large sums of cash in an
armored truck is an example. The transportation
schedule and route should be randomized as
much as possible to reduce the probability of
theft. To my knowledge, in models of macroeco-
nomic policy no one has created a positive case
for randomness.
It is sometimes argued that policy communi-
cations should be vague to retain policy flexibility.
My own view is that communications should be
clear about what is known and what is not. It is
possible to be perfectly clear about why flexibility
is necessary—why policy actions ordinarily can-
not be specified long in advance. The reason, as I
have already argued, is that policy actions ought
to be responsive to new information that cannot
itself be predicted.
COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES
The discussion so far has left implicit a num-
ber of communications challenges, which I will
now take up more explicitly.
Where the Fed has specialized information
that it can disclose without compromising confi-
dentially or the integrity of the policy process,
there is a strong argument for the Fed to make
such disclosure. In fact, for many years the Fed
has published the Beige Book several weeks before
each FOMC meeting. The Beige Book is a com-
pendium of anecdotal reports summarized dis-
trict by district across the country. This anecdotal
information supplements the formal statistical
information and is an important input to the policy
process. In other cases the Federal Reserve may
obtain specialized information through its own
research. Results of Federal Reserve research are
usually made available quite promptly in the
form of working papers on Federal Reserve web
sites.
At the conclusion of each FOMC meeting the
Committee releases a brief policy statement.
Policy statements also appear in speeches and
testimony of FOMC members. This public infor-
mation is not always perfectly clear. Part of the
difficulty lies in the inherent uncertainties in the
economy and uncertainties faced by Committee
members. It is also natural for different Committee
members to have somewhat different views and
for those views to evolve over time. From this
plethora of information it may be difficult for the
market to distill clear messages. For these reasons,
the summary policy statement at the conclusion
of each FOMC meeting and the FOMC minutes
of meetings play a critically important role.
My own view on the policy statement, stated
on a number of occasions in the past, is that the
policy statement needs to be put together from
relatively few standard elements. The way I
have put this point is that the English language
is incredibly rich, often with multiple meanings
for a given word. The various meanings can be
looked up in a good dictionary. However, there is
no dictionary in which we can look up the mean-
ing of a paragraph. In the past, market participants
have sometimes come to somewhat different
interpretations of FOMC policy statements. This
fact indicates to me that the Committee has not
communicated with as much clarity as desirable.
I do not pretend that the goal is easy to reach but
believe that progress will require greater standard-
ization over time in the structure of the statement
and in the options from which the statement is
put together.
There is a natural tendency to try to write in
an interesting and literate fashion. One way to
do so is to use synonyms to avoid repetition. The
practice can be tricky, however. Suppose one
policy statement describes the outlook as “solid”
and the next as “robust.” Is robust a shade higher
growth than solid? How much higher? Rhetorical
flourishes make for more interesting writing but
do not necessarily enhance clarity when it comes
to policy statements. Examples of this sort abound.
What is the difference between “moderate growth”
and “modest growth?”
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ceding one. The market looks closely at changes
in the adjectives used, the word order and every
other aspect of a statement. Sometimes I think
that a series of statements could evolve in such a
way that the meaning would be relatively clear,
given the evolution, even though the most recent
statement might be quite confusing if considered
on its own.
For these reasons, and others, I believe that
clarity in FOMC statements could be improved
by making them more stylized. A stylized state-
ment may be dull, but the market will search for
meaning whenever the statement changes. If we
want changes to have clear meaning, we need to
form the statement from stock phrases that have
been explained before.
I earlier emphasized that, in the rational
expectations equilibrium framework, random
policy disturbances do not serve a constructive
purpose. Avoiding random disturbances is not as
easy as it might seem, given that communication
is difficult and misunderstandings or incomplete
understanding is relatively easy. There are, how-
ever, some specific things that could be done.
Although I’ve emphasized statements, it is
also true that the market searches for meaning in
the policy actions themselves. An increase in the
intended rate of 25 basis points between sched-
uled meetings has a very different meaning than
the same size increase at a scheduled meeting.
To reduce uncertainty over the meaning of inter-
meeting policy actions, the FOMC could adopt
an explicit policy of making all policy adjust-
ments only at scheduled meetings unless there
were a compelling circumstance to act between
meetings. The compelling circumstance ordinar-
ily could be easily explained; indeed, the event
triggering a policy response would probably be
highly visible and the policy response occasion
no market surprise. An example would be the
policy action following the 9/11 attacks. A stan-
dard procedure of confining policy actions to
scheduled meetings would avoid market specu-
lation about the reasons for surprise policy adjust-
ments when they occur, and speculation that such
a surprise might occur. Given that there have
been only five intermeeting policy actions since
1994, this change would formalize what is now
customary practice.
Another explicit understanding could be
that all policy adjustments will be in increments
of 25 basis points, unless compelling reasons
argue for larger moves. The possibility that mar-
ket expectations of future rate changes might not
match the FOMC’s expectations is nicely illus-
trated by experience in the spring of 2004. At
that time the market understood that the FOMC
would be raising the funds rate target from the 1
percent level that had prevailed since June 2003,
and many in the market were concerned that the
pace of rate increases might be rapid, as they had
been in 1994. After its meeting of May 4, 2004,
the Committee issued a policy statement that
referred to a “measured pace” of policy actions
in an attempt to better align market expectations
with its own expectations.2 This concern would
not have been present if the FOMC had adopted
a policy of confining adjustments to 25 basis
points in the absence of a compelling reason to
act more forcefully. The measured pace language
did exactly what was intended, as press coverage
after the meeting noted.
Confining policy actions to 25 basis points as
a normal matter is pretty close to standard prac-
tice. Of the 47 policy actions from 1994 to date,
33 have been 25-basis-points changes, 13 have
been 50-basis-points changes and only one has
been a 75-basis-points change. There have been
no changes larger than 75 basis points.
I emphasized earlier the importance of the
distinction between a policy and a policy action.
In its communications, I believe that the FOMC
should work harder to explain how individual
policy actions fit into a comprehensive and sys-
tematic policy. When the market understands
why the FOMC acts as it does, the market will be
able to observe arriving information and judge
2 The full sentence in the policy statement was: “At this juncture, with inflation low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that policy
accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.”
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information. Appropriate market responses to
information will accelerate the economy’s
response to the information, improving the effi-
ciency of those responses. And, of course, FOMC




With my colleague Bob Rasche, I’ve been able
to study the effectiveness of FOMC communica-
tions. I’ve presented the results in some detail3;
here I’ll just report the bottom line. Over the past
decade, the market has been able to predict FOMC
policy adjustments with considerable accuracy.
That fact indicates that policy has been system-
atic enough, and communications effective
enough, that we’ve made major progress toward
achieving the goal of a full rational expectations
macroeconomic equilibrium. Relative to the
progress already made, my suggestions are minor
refinements. But that is the point we have reached,
and there is every reason to pursue further gains.
In my view, part of the reason the economy
has been so stable—indeed, increasingly stable—
over the past two decades or so is that monetary
policy has become much more predictable.
Greater predictability is a consequence of FOMC
success in adjusting the stance of monetary policy
in a much more rule-like way and the Committee’s
success in enhancing its communications with
the market and general public. I’ve suggested a
general framework for understanding communi-
cations issues—the full rational expectations
macroeconomic equilibrium. Perfecting that
equilibrium by making policy adjustments
increasingly regular and by reducing aspects of
policy that appear random to the market is a
worthy goal.
As I have argued, there are some further steps
along this road that the FOMC might consider. I
would welcome suggestions from market partici-
pants and academic experts. And, I would wel-




3 See “How Predictable is Fed Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2005, 87, pp. 659-68.